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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to find out whether announcements of cooperation 
negotiations and therefore possible layoffs have an impact on stock returns. 
Such announcements can be associated with either an increase or a decrease in 
firm value depending on the cited reason for starting the negotiations. 
 
28 Finnish companies are divided into two subsamples according to the reason 
they cite for starting cooperation negotiations. Statistical procedures are 
conducted to find out whether the two-day, three-day and twelve-day 
abnormal returns are statistically negative or positive. Ordinary least squares 
procedure is used to test the relation between two-day cumulative abnormal 
return, possible layoff size and firm size. 
 
According to the results, the abnormal returns are statistically negative on the 
two- and three-day periods for the firms that cite adverse market conditions as 
a reason for starting cooperation negotiations. The positive abnormal returns 
are not statistically different from zero. The results also show that the size of the 
firms in the efficiency-enhancing subsample may help investors to infer 
changes in firm values when they are announcing about cooperation 
negotiations. 
                                                              
KEYWORDS: Layoff announcement, abnormal return, event study        
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The popular press and some policy groups are increasingly reporting stories of 
firms that fire thousands of workers only to see large increases in the firm stock 
price. These firms may announce layoffs because there is a declining product 
demand or when the production process changes in a way to increase work 
productivity and reduce firm’s labor demand. Layoff announcements could be 
a signal from the firm that something needs to be done to fix its current 
situation, and in this case the layoffs are a positive sign of reorganization which 
will lead to a more successful firm. On the other hand, layoffs could be a sign 
that the firm is facing a downward trend. (Hallock 1998: 711-712.)  
 
Almost every textbook in economics, especially in the past, assumes that a 
company’s number one goal is to maximize profits. However, Brealey, Myers 
and Marcus (2001: 18) think that this term “maximize profits” is not a well-
defined corporate objective. For example, the term leaves open the question of 
“which year’s profits?” The company might be able to increase current profits 
by cutting back on staff training or maintenance. A firm could also be able to 
increase future profits by cutting this year’s dividend and investing this money 
in the firm. On the other hand, these actions may not be welcomed by 
shareholders if profits are damaged in the future. Of course, shareholders want 
their company to be profitable. Brealey et al. (2001) continue in their book that a 
smart and especially effective financial manager makes decisions which 
increase the current value of the company’s shares and the wealth of its 
stockholders.  
 
Levy and Sarnat (1990: 3-4) find many alternate goals for companies. Their list 
includes such aims as, maximization of sales, survival of the firm, achieving a 
satisfactory level of profits and a target market share, some minimum level of 
employee turnover, and maximization of managerial salaries. Levy & Sarnat 
(1990) believe that the list is a never ending game and no single goal can express 
all of the complexities of the decision process.  
 
There has been a persistent debate on the importance of shareholder value 
relative to other measures such as employment, social responsibility and the 
environment. Usually this debate takes the form of “shareholder versus 
stakeholder” (Copeland, Koller and Murrin 2000: 3). Copeland et al. (2000) 
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believe that managers should focus on value creation for two reasons. First 
reason is that in most developed countries, shareholder influence already 
dominates the philosophy of top management. Secondly, shareholder-oriented 
economies seem to perform better than other economic systems and other 
stakeholders do not suffer on behalf of shareholders. Nevertheless, Copeland et 
al. (2000) do not think that the shareholder value system is always perceived as 
fair. Job losses from restructuring are a good example of unfairness. Some say 
that a better measure of fairness is the economy’s ability to create jobs, or its 
lack to do so.  
 
The shareholder idea has been criticized for its singular purpose and focus, 
because there are other ways of investing in a business. Other stakeholders, 
such as suppliers, creditors, customers, employees, communities and so on, also 
invest their resources into to success of the firm. Although a company has a 
responsibility for economic success and to satisfy stockholders, it must also 
answer to these other stakeholders mentioned. (Ferrell, Fraedrich and Ferrell 
2005: 84.)     
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
Research on layoff announcements has mostly focused on the reactions of those 
who are laid off and those who remain in the organization after layoff 
announcements. As a result, there is a lot of information available about how 
members of these groups react to layoffs, especially their reactions to perceived 
injustice. Generally and especially in Finland, less information is available 
about how layoffs affect the firm value and how investors interpret the reasons 
behind layoff announcements. Therefore this thesis is to investigate the relation 
between layoffs and firm value with Finnish data.    
 
Although the theoretical part keeps its main focus on actual layoff 
announcements, the point of this study is to examine whether announcements 
of starting cooperation negotiations have an impact on stock prices in Finnish 
market. Firms announce about cooperation negotiations in public and these 
negotiations often lead to laying off employees, so therefore the theoretical part 
can be assumed to support this aspect as well. The framework comes from the 
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study by Palmon, Sun and Tang (1997). They document an association between 
the cited reasons in layoff announcements and abnormal stock returns around 
layoff announcement dates. This association shows that investors view the 
reasons for layoff decisions as signals which can help them interpret the effect 
on layoff decisions on company values. 
 
Reasons for possible layoff decisions are divided into two parts in this study, 
following the example set by Palmon et al. (1997). Layoff decisions induced by 
adverse market conditions, such as demand declines or input price increases, 
should be associated with declines in firm values. The second part reviews 
unexpected layoff decisions that result from unexpected efficiency gains or 
plans for efficiency improvements. These types of decisions should be 
associated with higher firm values. The hypotheses of this study are set as 
follows: 
 
H1:          The returns on equities should be abnormally negative (or positive) for 
those firms that cite an adverse market condition (or improving 
efficiency) as the reason for starting cooperation negotiations. 
 
H2:          The magnitude of the abnormal negative (positive) returns on equity is 
directly related to the magnitude of the possible layoffs for those firms 
that cite an adverse market condition (improving efficiency) as the 
reason for cooperation negotiations. 
 
1.2. Structure of the study 
 
Literature and previous studies about the matter are introduced in the first 
chapters to approach the problem. In some cases it is necessary to limit the topic 
to keep the actual matter of the subject under control. Some boundaries are to 
be set, for example in chapter four which concerns the company valuation. 
There are many other models for presenting stock valuation, but only the most 
common ones are presented here. Especially a number of performance 
measures are left out. In chapter five, the stakeholder idea plays the key role, 
leaving less interest to the shareholder concept, which is being briefly 
introduced also in the introduction part.   
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As a whole, chapter two covers previous researches and their results. Chapter 
three illustrates the market efficiency –setting. This chapter includes the three 
forms of market efficiency as well as the concepts of information asymmetry 
and agency problem. Ways for company and stock valuation are presented in 
chapter four and chapter five deals with a current topic, corporate social 
responsibility. Chapter six introduces the data and method of this study, and 
chapter seven presents and analyzes the results. Finally, chapter eight 
concludes this research.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Massive layoffs have been used as a popular restructuring and cost-cutting tool 
and the academic literature has also started to pay attention to layoffs. Previous 
studies examining the impact of layoff announcements (LAs) indicate that the 
announcement of a layoff has significant effect on a company’s common stock 
price, but the evidence regarding the direction of the share price response and 
the information contained in such announcements is mixed.  
 
Studies on LAs have shown that the market reaction depends on the type of the 
layoff announcement. Overall, LAs induce a negative reaction in the stock 
market but when investigated further, it has been shown that the market 
response depends on the financial condition of the firm and the reason for the 
announcement. When the announcement is made by a firm in an unfavorable 
financial situation or for reasons indicating something negative about the firm, 
the reaction is more negative than with announcements indicating something 
positive about the firm’s reason for the layoff and the firm’s financial health in 
general. Even positive returns can be resulted from an announcement based on 
reasons that aim to reduce the costs of the company. 
  
 
2.1. Layoff announcements and stock returns 
 
Layoffs are often associated with corporate restructuring, such as plant closing 
and plant relocation, and human resources management decisions. Some 
studies have examined layoffs from this perspective also. Abowd, Milkovich 
and Hannon (1990) examine “human resources” management decisions, 
including layoffs. They do not find a significant association between human 
resources management decisions and stock returns. Blackwell, Marr and Spivey 
(1990) find that plant closing announcements are usually associated with 
negative stock returns. Blackwell at al. (1990) show that when the stated reason 
for a plant closing is “operations not profitable” or “consolidation of facilities”, 
the abnormal returns are more negative than the returns when the cited reason 
is “ labor-management dispute”.  Chan, Gau and Wang (1995) find that the 
stock market reacts positively to business relocation decisions motivated by 
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improving efficiency, but negatively to relocation decisions motivated by 
capacity reduction due to a worsening business environment.  
 
Davidson III, Worrell and Fox (1996) examine early retirement programs, which 
can be used as substitutes for layoffs. Davidson et al. (1996) segment their 
sample according to the abnormal returns prior to the announcement. Firms 
with positive abnormal returns prior to the announcement of the retirement 
plans have positive returns around the announcement date. On the other hand, 
firms with negative returns prior to the announcement have insignificant 
returns around the announcement date.  
 
Hearth and Zaima (1984) investigate corporate divestment announcements. 
They find positive abnormal returns and an association between the abnormal 
returns and pre-announcement financial strength. Statman and Sepe (1989) find 
positive excess returns around announcement dates of project termination. 
They assume that investors know the reasons causing the termination decisions, 
and that the positive returns show up because investors are not sure that 
management will terminate unprofitable projects. 
 
Filbeck and Webb (2001) test the impact of layoff announcements on share price 
returns with respect to the magnitude of the layoff on the total firm workforce, 
the level of inside ownership and the firm size. They find statistically significant 
negative share price responses associated with layoff announcements, and that 
layoff announcements involving a greater percentage of a firm’s workers result 
in more negative share price responses. The study also discovers that the firm 
size is often used as a proxy for information asymmetry. Information 
asymmetry can be higher for small firms because of, for example, smaller firms 
receive less media attention and analyst coverage compared to larger 
companies. Less coverage may imply that less information is available on 
smaller firms. Filbeck and Webb (2001) confirm that the absolute value of the 
share price responses is negatively associated with firm size. This means that 
shareholders react more strongly to the announcements of layoffs coming from 
smaller firms, rather than larger ones.    
 
This study’s pattern is mostly based on the research conducted by Palmon, Sun 
and Tang (1997). They find that the reason stated by management for the layoff 
is the determining factor in the share price response to layoff announcements. 
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Statistically negative returns are associated with the declining-demand 
subsample and with firms not stating a reason for the layoff in their 
announcement. Statistically positive returns are associated with the efficiency-
enhancing subsample.  
 
 
2.2. Financial performance of layoff companies 
 
Mirabal and DeYoung’s (2005) article examines the findings of empirical 
research studies and other sources to determine the impact of downsizing as a 
strategic intervention on financial performance. One way of downsizing can be 
carried out by cutting down the number of employees. In their article, Mirabal 
& DeYoung (2005) state that management should be aware that large-scale 
downsizing may produce significant levels of under-performance. In contrast, 
smaller-scaled interventions have less of an impact on financial performance.  
 
De Meuse, Bergmann, Vanderheiden and Roraff (2004) studied the long-term 
relationship between downsizing and financial performance. In comparing the 
companies which did or did not announce layoffs, the results show that 
companies which announced layoffs as a downsizing program performed 
significantly poorer up to two years following the announcement. Beginning of 
the third year made the difference statistically insignificant. De Meuse et al. 
(2004) also noticed that companies which had laid off a smaller amount of 
people performed better in the year of the announcement, but after this year 
there were no remarkable financial differences found. Companies laying off 10 
per cent or more of the work force notably under-performed firms laying of less 
employees.   
 
2.3. Other studies 
 
Abraham (2004) examined the effect of layoff and employment guarantee 
announcements (EGA) on the shareholder returns of 154 firms that announced 
layoffs in 1993-1994. Conceptually, and EGA can be viewed as the opposite of 
layoff announcement, which means that the firm is reducing the size of its labor 
force. An EGA means that the firm will not be able to reduce the size of its 
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workforce or payroll for the term of the guarantee. Abraham’s (2004) results 
show that the returns of his samples responded negatively to the both kinds of 
announcements. The results also show that investors do not perceive much of a 
signaling effect from and EGA, and that EGAs are not perceived by the market 
as signal that the firm’s financial situation is identified as “healthy”. Some 
might think that an EGA would send a signal to investors that the firm has 
sufficient financial health to ensure continued employment to its employees for 
the term of the guarantee.  
 
Hallock’s (1998) paper discusses the connection between layoffs, executive pay 
and stock prices. In general firms that announce layoffs in the previous year pay 
their chief executive officers (CEOs) more. Also, a small negative share price 
reaction to layoff announcements was discovered. Hallock’s (1998) results 
suggest that CEOs who head firms with layoff announcements in the previous 
year are likely to have higher pay and larger percentage raises than CEOs who 
head firms that are not cutting jobs. On average, the share price reaction is 
negative but very small.   
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3. CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
The primary role of a capital market is allocation of ownership of the economy’s 
capital stock. The ideal is a market in which prices provide accurate signals for 
resource allocation. This type of a market includes an assumption that security 
prices at all times fully reflect all available information (Fama 1970: 383). 
Brealey & Myers (1996: 323-324) state that when the market is efficient, all 
information is widely and cheaply available to investors and that all relevant 
and ascertainable information is already reflected in security prices.  
 
According to Copeland, Weston and Shastri (2005: 372) capital market efficiency 
relies on the ability of arbitrageurs to recognize that prices are out of line and to 
make a profit by driving them back to an average value consistent with 
available information. Brealey & Myers (1996) mention a true value in their 
book, and by this definition they mean that the competition among investment 
analysts will lead to a stock market in which prices at any time reflect true 
value.  
 
 
3.1. Perfect and efficient capital markets 
 
Copeland et al. (2005: 353-354) find it important to contrast efficient capital 
markets with perfect capital markets, and the following conditions may be 
considered as necessary for perfect capital markets: 
 
1. Markets are frictionless; there are no transaction costs or taxes, all assets are 
perfectly divisible and marketable and there are no constraining regulations. 
 
2. There is perfect competition in securities markets, which means that in these 
securities markets all participants are price takers.  
 
3. Markets are informationally efficient; information is costless and it is received 
simultaneously by all individuals. 
 
4. All individuals are rational and want to maximize their expected utility.    
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When these conditions are given, product and securities markets will be both 
allocationally and operationally efficient. A market is said to be allocationally 
efficient when prices are determined in a way that equates the marginal rates of 
return for all producers and savers. Scarce savings are optimally allocated to 
productive investments in a way that benefits everyone. Operational efficiency 
deals with the cost of transferring funds. In the world of perfect capital markets 
transaction costs are assumed to be zero and markets are perfectly liquid.  
 
Copeland et al. (2005) continue that some of the perfect market assumptions can 
be relaxed to show the differences between perfect markets and efficient capital 
markets. Capital market efficiency is much less restrictive conception than 
perfect capital markets. In an efficient capital market, prices fully and 
instantaneously reflect all available relevant information. This means that when 
assets are traded, prices are accurate signals for capital markets. By easing up 
some of the assumptions of perfect markets, efficient capital markets still can 
exist even if the markets are not frictionless. Prices will still reflect all available 
information if, for example, brokerage fees have to be paid by the securities 
traders. There can also be imperfect competition and allocative inefficiencies in 
product markets but still have efficient capital markets. If a firm can gain from 
monopoly profits in the product market, the efficient capital market will 
determine a security price that fully reflects the present value of the anticipated 
stream of monopoly profits.  
 
 
3.1.1. Competition as the source of efficiency 
 
Arbitrageurs trying to profit by recognizing when the prices are out of line is a 
behavioral paradigm, which might raise questions among people. Capital 
market efficiency implies that nobody can beat the market. Some might wonder 
that how can analysts be expected to exist since according to this implication 
they too cannot beat the market. The existence of a huge security analysis 
industry is also difficult to explain when markets are efficient. However, 
analysts are able to make profits by competing with each other. If the profit to 
analysis becomes abnormally large, then new individuals will enter the analysis 
business until, on average, the return from analysis equals the cost. (Copeland 
et al. 2005: 372.) 
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According to Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2005: 372) investors should not expect 
that all available information is being reflected on stock prices. There are a lot of 
investors who are willing to spend plenty of time and money on gathering 
information, and it might be reasonable that some of them would be able to 
come up with something that has been overlooked by the rest of the investment 
community. Bodie et al. continue that when information is costly to uncover 
and analyze, one would expect investment analysis calling for such 
expenditures to result in an increased expected return.  
 
 
3.1.2. Three forms of market efficiency  
 
When defining market efficiency, the attention is not paid to the form of the 
structural relationship between risk and expected return. More attention is paid 
to the precision with which the market prices securities in relation to its 
structure (Haugen 1997: 641). Haugen (1997) continues that if prices respond to 
all new relevant information in a rapid fashion, it can be said that the market is 
relatively efficient. Instead, if the information disseminates rather slowly 
throughout the market, and if investors take time in analyzing the information 
and maybe even overreacting to it, prices may deviate from values based on a 
careful analysis of all available information. This kind of a market could be 
characterized as being relatively inefficient.  
 
One way to measure the efficiency of the market is to ask what types of 
information, encompassed by the total set of all available information, are 
reflected in securities prices (Haugen 1997: 642). In Figure 1 the outer circle 
represents all information relevant to the valuation of a particular stock which 
has come to one’s knowledge, such as publicly available information about the 
company, its industry and the domestic and world economy. It also includes 
the information being privately held by select groups of individuals. The 
second circle represents the part of the information set that has been publicly 
announced and is therefore publicly available. Thus, the information outside of 
this set is inside or private information. The smallest circle represents the subset 
of the information that is publicly available. Any information relevant to the 
valuation of the stock which can be learned by analyzing the history of the 
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market price of the stock is represented in this third circle. (Haugen 1997: 642-
643.) 
 
 
All available information including inside
or private information  
 
 
 All public information  
 
 
Information in 
past  
stock prices 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Subsets of available information for a given stock. (Haugen 1997: 643.) 
 
 
Fama (1970: 383) has defined three types of efficiency. Bodie et al. (2005: 373) 
have also distinguished three forms of the efficient market hypothesis. These 
forms are the weak, semistrong and strong forms of efficiency, and they differ 
by their notions of what is meant by the phrase “all prices fully reflect all 
relevant information”.   
 
The weak form hypothesis suggests that stock prices already reflect all 
information that can be derived by examining market trading data such as the 
history of past prices, trading volume or short interest (Bodie et al. 2005: 373). 
Brealey, Myers & Marcus (2001: 360) write that the sequence of past price 
changes contains no information about future changes. They carry on that this 
is often expressed by economists by saying that “stock prices follow a random 
walk” or “the market has no memory”. If the weak form is in effect, technical 
analysis or charting becomes ineffective. There is no information in the past 
series which is useful in predicting the future, because the information has been 
analyzed by thousands of watchful chartists everywhere. These chartists have 
acted on what they have found and the stock price has settled to a level which 
reflects all the useful information imbedded in past stock prices. (Haugen 1997: 
644.)  
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Jarrett and Kyper (2005) examine the weak form of the market efficiency 
hypothesis in the United States. Their results indicate that this form of efficient 
markets hypothesis is questionable when one must make decisions concerning 
investing in stock market securities. Daily variation was not found to be either 
random or stochastic and it is possible to predict daily patterns with some 
degree of accuracy. 
 
Under the semistrong form of the efficient market hypothesis no investor can 
earn excess returns from trading rules based on any publicly available 
information, for example annual reports of companies (Copeland et al. 2005: 
355). Haugen (1997: 644) thinks that if this type of efficiency is valid, no form of 
analysis will help one to attain superior returns as long as the analysis is based 
on publicly available information. All sources of public information, such as 
accounting statements, have been analyzed by a number of analysts already 
and therefore the current stock price reflects all relevant information gathered 
from these accounting statements.  
 
Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey (1997) examine the possibility of outsiders to profit 
from mimicking the trades of insiders after having publicly reported their 
trades. Their study was conducted using data from the US market and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all insiders to register their 
trading activity. If it is possible for outsiders to benefit from mimicking insiders, 
this situation is inconsistent with the semistrong form of market efficiency 
hypothesis. In contrast, situation where insiders are not able to get abnormal 
returns by copying the acts of insiders is consistent with the semistrong 
efficiency. Evidence from both situations has been discovered. Bettis et al. (1997) 
paper’s results suggest that outsiders are able to earn abnormal returns.  The 
results claim that outside traders can profit from using publicly available 
information, in this case insider-trading data, and therefore the results imply 
that market is not efficient in the semistrong form.  
 
Finally, Fama (1970: 383) defines the strong form version of the efficient market 
hypothesis. This type of form discusses whether investors or groups have a 
monopolistic access to any relevant information for stock price formation. Bodie 
et al. (2005: 373) say that this version of the hypothesis is quite extreme. Under 
this form, prices would fully reflect all information even though it might be 
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held exclusively by insiders. These corporate insiders might take advantage of 
this situation and try to profit from trading on the essential information before 
it is publicly released. However, Haugen (1997: 644) says that under this 
ultimate version of efficiency, the professional investor truly has a zero market 
value because no form of search or processing of information will consistently 
produce superior returns.   
 
 
3.2. Information asymmetry and agency theory 
 
Competitive market equilibrium should result when traders have differential 
information. However, in some cases information asymmetry may occur, 
especially when one group of participants has better or timelier information 
than other groups. There are several situations in which two groups of agents 
interact and in which the other group is imperfectly informed about the quality 
of products offered by the other group. Typically this imperfectly informed 
group is considered as outsiders, for example investors. A firm or its 
management is considered as insiders, and they have either perfect information 
about the product quality or at least superior information to outsiders. 
Therefore, there seems to be an information asymmetry between the insiders 
and the outsiders, and this asymmetry can cause markets to break down or 
even disappear altogether. (Strong & Walker 1987: 143.) 
 
Copeland et al. (2005: 416) present Akerlof’s (1970) framework where an 
information asymmetry exists in a general product market setting. In the 
setting, a market in which informed sellers offer cars of different quality 
differences to buyers, who while being aware that the quality differences exist 
are unable tell the quality of particular cars. Information asymmetry develops 
since the sellers have more knowledge about the cars than the buyers. Because 
the buyers cannot tell the difference between good and bad cars, they are 
willing to offer the same amount of for both. Thus, the good and the bad cars 
will be sold for the same price, and the sellers cannot receive the true value of 
the vehicles.  
 
Asymmetric information in the sense of one group of individuals being better 
informed than another group is a pervasive phenomenon in real world’s stock 
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markets (Strong & Walker 1987: 164). Milgrom and Roberts (1992) discuss the 
problematic issues of interpreting layoff announcements. Problems arise 
because of the cross-section of possibilities for layoffs purpose. They continue 
arguing that information asymmetries exist between managers and investors 
because managers, as insiders, only know how much effort they are willing to 
expend to enhance shareholder wealth. Insider managers have different kinds 
of costly or costless ways of reducing this asymmetry (Copeland et al. 2005: 
438). The question is whether managers will have an appropriate incentive to 
truthfully reveal their private information to outside investors and whether any 
costs will be incurred in communicating this information.   
 
Agency theory is also concerned with matters that arise when insider managers 
have an information advantage over the investors. Strong & Walker (1987: 92) 
highlight a question of how to motivate managers to take decisions consistent 
with the outside shareholders’ interests. Models of agency theory show that 
managers have a number of decision variables under their control which are not 
directly observable by the outside shareholders. In some models managers even 
have access to additional private information at the time they make their 
decision choice. 
 
Agency theory includes questions relating to the control of the behavior of the 
relatively well informed by the less informed. The simplest instance of an 
agency theory is on in which one party, principal, hires another party, agent, to 
undertake certain activities on behalf of the principal. Agency problems in firms 
arise because corporate decisions are made by managers (agents) on behalf of 
the firm’s capital suppliers (principals). One example of an agency theory could 
be agent’s compensation system which is chosen by principal. This 
compensation system depends on the performance measures that the principal 
specifies as well as the final outcome. After the agent has, for example, made a 
decision of financing and investment the final outcome is determined among 
some other random factors. Now the agent gets paid according to his 
compensation contract and the principal gets to keep the difference between the 
final outcome and the agent’s compensation. (Copeland et al. 2005: 439, 449; 
Strong & Walker 1987: 166.) 
 
Agency theory has been applied to number of different areas in finance. Mainly 
it has focused on the structure of managerial compensation contracts, but the 
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theory also analyzes the impact of the conflict between managers and a firm’s 
shareholders. Filbeck & Webb (2001: 34) believe that higher level of insider 
ownership has a positive effect on the share price response to the layoff 
announcement. The fact that managers are owners means that the costs of false 
signals might result in negative personal economic consequences. 
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4. COMPANY AND STOCK VALUATION 
 
The starting points for company valuation are presented in this chapter. The 
main emphasis is being put on stock valuation. There are a number of ways to 
valuate stocks, and just the basic models are introduced here. There are also 
plenty of performance measures that help valuating stocks. However, Fuller 
and Farrell’s (1987) framework is used in this study. They showed the two basic 
approaches to determine the value of common stocks. One is to estimate the 
present value of the expected dividends associated with the stock. The other is a 
price per earnings ratio. Other ways to valuate stock are not discussed in this 
thesis.   
 
Copeland et al. (2000: 3) believe that managers who focus on building 
shareholder value will create healthier companies than those who do not. They 
also believe that healthier companies will lead to stronger economies, higher 
living standards and more career and business opportunities for individuals.  
 
There has always been a tough discussion about the importance of shareholder 
value relative to other measures such as employment, social responsibility and 
the environment. Especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, most 
weight is put on the idea that shareholders are the owners of the corporation. 
The board of directors acts as the shareholders’ representative and is elected by 
them, and the objective function of a corporation is to maximize shareholder 
value. In Europe, a broader view of the objectives of business organizations has 
been more influential, and the weight is put on such matters as the continuity of 
the corporation. Shareholder value has become a trend in Europe also during 
the first years of the 21st century. (Copeland, Koller & Murrin 2000: 3.) 
 
4.1. The starting points for valuing a company 
 
According to Kallunki, Martikainen and Niemelä (1999: 22), as a decision-
making process the definition of a company’s value can be divided into three 
main sections and they are: 
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1. Strategic analysis 
2. Analyzing the financial statement 
3. Prediction of the development. 
 
A company’s value should be influenced by the firm itself, but also by the 
development of the surrounding society. Sufficient knowledge of the industry 
and the company’s status at the market is needed to provide a comprehensive 
strategic analysis. The aim of a strategic analysis is to recognize the factors that 
affect company’s financial success, such as the market size and the approximate 
growth rate.  
 
Analyzing the financial statement aims to evaluate company’s profitability, 
wealth and financial position. Companies are able to use some means to show a 
different sum of profit. This is also called as profit planning and one of the main 
focuses are point of views concerned with taxes. Profit planning makes it 
necessary for analysts to modify companies’ financial statements so that they 
reflect the true financial standing of the company.  
 
When defining a company’s value, it is essential to estimate how the company 
will survive in the future. This estimation may be based on the company’s own 
evaluations and predictions but using outside consults is also very common. 
Consults can gather information from for example the annual reports of the 
company or from financial statements. Bigger, usually listed companies are 
often analyzed by professionals and they can give a good comprehensive 
picture of the company’s situation. (Kallunki et al. 1999: 22-28.) 
 
 
4.2. Models for stock valuation 
 
The return on common stock, dividends and capital gains, is very uncertain, 
and can change from period to period. The value of a share of stock to an 
investor is determined by the size of the return and the degree of the risk together. 
The return on the asset consists of three factors; the amount of money that the 
asset is expected to generate, the point in time when the money flows are 
expected to occur and finally, the effect of inflation. Risk, on the other hand, is a 
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measure of the estimated range within which future returns are likely to fall. 
(Levy & Sarnat 1988: 149; Barker 2001: 14.) 
 
Fuller & Farrell Jr. (1987: 274) suggest that there are two basic approaches to 
determinate the value of a share of common stocks. One approach is to estimate 
the present value of the expected dividends associated with the stock. The other 
way is to determine an appropriate multiplier of the firm’s earnings, which is 
also called a price per earnings ratio. The latter approach has been commonly 
used by security analysts for deciding whether stocks are under- or overpriced.  
 
4.2.1. The dividend discount model 
 
The value of a common stock is determined by the cash flow the stock provides 
to its owners. In the case of common stocks, the cash flow is the cash dividend 
stream, including any liquidating dividend when the firm ceases operations 
(Fuller & Farrell 1987: 275). The present value of the expected dividend stream 
can be written as: 
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where  P = current stock price 0
E(D t ) = expected dividend in year t 
n= number of years the firms operates 
  r = appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate 
 
Barker (2001) regards dividend discount model (DDM) as the fundamental equity 
valuation model and therefore DDM is the basis for all theoretical valuation 
models. However, Bodie et al. (2005: 611) say that this equation is not very 
useful in valuing stocks because it requires dividend forecasts for every year 
into the indefinite future.  
 
4.2.2. The constant growth dividend discount model 
 
Equation (4-1) is not very practical since one is forced to estimate each dividend 
paid over the life of the firm (Fuller & Farrell 1987: 276). This creates a need for 
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a simplified model, a constant growth dividend discount model. Sometimes this 
approach is also referred as the Gordon model. This simplified model makes 
three extremely strong assumptions and because of this, the constant growth 
dividend discount model is not very useful for estimating particularly 
individual stock prices. On the other hand it helps to understand the primary 
determinants of stock prices, and it might be useful for estimating the price of 
large groups of stocks. Fuller & Farrell (1987) present these three assumptions 
as well as the whole model in their book. First of all, the assumptions are: 
 
1. The stream of dividends is perpetual (n Æ ∞). 
2. Dividends grow at a constant rate of g forever. 
3. The discount rate is greater than the growth rate (r > g).  
 
The final form of the Gordon model can be written as 
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where  D 1  = dividend to be received over next 12 months 
 
Despite the fact that the first assumption is quite strong, equation (4-2) is still a 
useful model for analyzing the primary determinants of stock prices and 
returns. The equation (4-2) can also be rearranged as follows: 
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In this case, the total return that investors receive from common stocks can be 
broken down into two components, the dividend yield D 1 /P  and growth g. If 
the expected return rate r remains constant, the growth rate in the stock price 
will equal the growth rate of dividends. It is obvious that r does not remain 
constant over the time, but equation (4-3) is still a useful tool for analyzing long-
run stock returns at least for large portfolios of stocks such as the market 
indexes. (Fuller & Farrell 1987: 277-288.) 
0
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4.2.3. The price per earnings ratio  
 
Earnings are shareholders’ profits and also the main output of a company’s 
accounting system. Investors seek to establish a direct relationship between 
earnings and share prices in the form of price per earnings (P/E) ratio. The share 
price is the present value of all future earnings generated by a company, and 
therefore, the P/E ratio summarizes the value of all future earnings relative to 
current earnings. (Barker 2001: 55.) 
 
Investors have traditionally utilized P/E ratio models more than dividend 
discount models. P/E ratio is not as accurate as dividend discount models, but it 
has plenty of attractive attributes. P/E ratio provides a convenient standard for 
comparing the prices of shares of stock which have different levels of earnings 
per share, because P/E ratio indicates the price per euro of earnings. One of the 
attractive attributes is also the fact, that for stocks which do not currently pay 
dividends, a P/E ratio might be easier to use than a dividend discount model. 
Third, the estimates used as inputs in P/E ratio may be easier to make than the 
estimates necessary for dividend discount models. (Fuller & Farrell 1987: 362-
363.) 
 
Fuller & Farrell (1987) use the equation (4-2) as a starting point for developing a 
framework for P/E ratio. The Gordon model was: 
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Now, the dividend can be written as earnings E multiplied by the dividend 
payout ratio b, and dropping the time subscript due to simplifying matters, the 
constant growth model can be shown as: 
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Rearranging terms to solve for the P/E ratio, the general relationship can be 
written as: 
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Therefore, the P/E ratio can be viewed as a function of three variables, which 
are the dividend payout ratio, the discount rate and the growth rate. According 
to the equation (4-6), the higher the payout ratio, the higher is the P/E ratio 
when everything else is held constant. The same relationship holds for P/E 
ratios and growth rates, but there is a negative relationship between P/E ratios 
and discount rates. Thus, the higher the discount rate, the lower the P/E ratio 
gets and the opposite. (Fuller & Farrell 1987: 363.) 
 
 
4.3. Risk valuation with CAPM 
 
According to Levy & Sarnat (1988) the value of a share of stock to an investor is 
determined by the size of the return and the degree of the risk together. In this 
section, risk is discussed using the capital asset pricing model, CAPM. Bodie et 
al. (2005: 281) state that CAPM is a centerpiece of modern financial economics, 
and with this model it is possible to get precise predictions of the relationships 
between the risk of an asset and its expected return. CAPM assumes that 
securities are traded in perfect capital market with the following assumptions: 
 
1. Risk aversion. Investors are risk-averse. 
2. Information. All relevant information is freely available to all investors. 
3. Investment horizon. All investors’ decisions are assumed to be made at 
specific point in time, and all investments are held for the same period. 
4. Costs. CAPM assumes no transaction costs or taxes.  
5. Interest rate. All investors can lend or borrow any amount of money   
without affecting the interest rate. 
 
Using the CAPM, the riskiness of any individual security or asset can be 
divided into two parts, systematic and nonsystematic risk. Therefore, the total 
security risk is these two combined. Nonsystematic risk can be eliminated by 
combining it in a diversified portfolio. It is called nonsystematic because there is 
no systematic relationship between this portion of a security’s risk and general 
market fluctuations. Systematic risk, on the other hand, is the part of a 
security’s risk that cannot be eliminated by including it in a diversified 
portfolio. It is affected by the market fluctuations. In the CAPM, it is only the 
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systematic part of the risk that affects the expected return. Nonsystematic part 
can always be eliminated through diversification.  
 
In case there is more than one security in a portfolio, the risk of each individual 
security depends on its correlation with all the others. The CAPM avoids this 
type of complication by providing a single measure of a security’s risk, called 
beta, β. Beta can be calculated as follows: 
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where  R i = return of security i 
  R m = return of market portfolio 
 
Beta provides a measure of the very important systematic component of a 
security’s risk. The higher a security’s beta is, while other things are being 
constant, the higher is the systematic risk. When the presented assumptions 
take place, following market equilibrium can be seen according to the CAPM. 
(Levy & Sarnat 1988: 184-186.) 
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where  E(R i ) = expected return of security i 
  R f  = risk free return   
  iβ  = the risk of security i 
  E(R m ) = expected return of market portfolio 
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5. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In the 1970’s theologians and philosophers started to suggest that certain 
principles could be applied to business activities. Using this foundation, 
business professors began to teach and write about social responsibility, which 
according to one definition is organization’s obligation to maximize its positive 
impact on stakeholders and to minimize its negative impact. Ethical theory and 
philosophical analysis were applied to structure the discipline of business 
ethics. This caused companies to become more concerned about their public 
images and as the social demands grew, many businesses realized that they had 
to address ethical issues more directly. (Ferrell et al. 2005: 10.) 
 
There are many ways for a company to take part in social responsibility. 
Companies can, for example, give grants and corporate sponsorships to arts, 
community improvement and educational causes. It is also possible to support 
employees with flexible work schedules, holiday daycare as well as daycare 
centers for new parents. New buildings can be built economically, conforming 
to environmental guidelines, energy sufficiency, water conservation and so on. 
(Ferrell et al. 2005: 47.)  
 
 
5.1. Socially responsible behavior 
 
There have been conflicting expectations of the nature of companies’ 
responsibilities to society for a long time. It is difficult to define what socially 
responsible behavior actually is as opposed to management, corporate image 
management or other activities aimed mainly at business benefits. After all, the 
primary role of business is said to be providing goods and services that society 
wants and needs. The basic idea of corporate social responsibility is that 
businesses and societies are thought as combined rather than separate entities 
(Moir 2001: 1). Mohr, Webb and Harris (2001: 47) define CSR as “a company’s 
commitment to minimizing or eliminating any harmful effects and maximizing 
its long-run beneficial impact on society”.   
 
Socially responsible behavior includes a wide collection of actions such as 
behaving ethically, supporting the work of nonprofit organizations, treating 
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employees fairly and minimizing damage to the environment. Socially 
responsible companies consider the effects of their actions whether they are 
directly related to the companies or not. A company can be managed using a 
stakeholder or a shareholder theory. A stakeholder theory is based on the 
assumption that companies must consider the effects of their actions on all 
constituencies, such as shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, the 
environment and the community, even when profitability is reduced. 
According to a shareholder theory, the only responsibility of a company is to 
legally make profits for its shareholders. Mohr and Webb (2005: 122) suggest 
that socially responsible companies must be managed by using a stakeholder 
theory. 
 
To remove the opportunity for employees to make unethical decisions, most 
companies have adopted formal systems accountability, oversight and control, 
known as corporate governance. Corporate governance is a part of company’s 
culture. Having no governance system at all or having an unsatisfactory one, 
opportunities for top managers to put their own self-interests before those of 
important for stakeholders, are created. Some organizations take the view that 
as long as they are maximizing stockholder wealth and profitability, they are 
fulfilling their core responsibilities. Other firms believe that a business is an 
important member of society and therefore must assume broad responsibilities 
that include following the social norms and expectations. From these two 
assumptions, Ferrell et al. (2005: 83) derive two major approaches to corporate 
governance. The two approaches are the shareholder model and the 
stakeholder model.  
 
Shareholder model of corporate governance 
 
The shareholder model of corporate governance includes classic economic 
concepts, such as the goal of maximizing wealth for investors and owners. 
Especially for publicly traded firms, corporate governance focuses on 
developing and improving the formal system for maintaining performance 
accountability between top management and the firms’ shareholders. Therefore, 
a shareholder orientation should force a firm’s decisions toward serving the 
best interests of investors. An agency problem can be observed underlying 
these assumptions. Managers act as agents for investors, whose number one 
goal is to increase the value of their stocks. Managers, on the other hand, may 
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have motivations beyond stockholder value, such as market share, personal 
compensation or attachment to particular product or projects. Shareholder 
model is said to be a more restrictive antecedent to the stakeholder orientation.  
 
Stakeholder model of corporate governance 
 
The stakeholder model of corporate governance adopts a wide view of the 
purpose of business. A company has a responsibility for economic success to 
satisfy its stockholders but it must also take into consideration other 
stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, communities and other groups 
with which the company interacts. Companies’ limited resources make it 
necessary to determine which of their stakeholders are primary. As soon as the 
primary groups have been determined, managers must then implement the 
appropriate corporate governance systems to promote the development of long-
term relationships. The stakeholder approach involves creating governance 
systems that consider stakeholder welfare in concert with corporate needs and 
interests. Many businesses have evolved into this type of orientation as a result 
of government initiatives, consumer activism, industry activity and other 
external forces. (Ferrell et al. 2005: 83-84.) 
 
 
5.2. The stakeholder idea 
 
The dominant theme in the social responsibility research is the stakeholder 
theory of a corporation. In a business context, customers, investors and 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, government agencies, communities and 
many others who have a “stake” or claim in some aspect of a company’s 
products, operations, markets, industry and outcomes are known as stakeholders 
(Ferrell et al. 2005: 26). These groups are influenced by business, but they also 
have the ability to affect businesses. Stakeholders provide resources that are 
more or less critical to a firm’s long-term success. For example, shareholders 
provide capital, suppliers offer material resources and local communities 
supply infrastructure. Stakeholders’ ability to even threaten to withdraw these 
resources gives them power over businesses.  
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Stakeholder orientation of a firm can be referred to the degree of which the 
company understands stakeholders’ demands. According to Ferrell et al. (2005: 
29), this orientation consists of three sets of activities: 
 
1.) the organization-wide generation of data about stakeholder groups and 
assessment of the firm’s effects on these groups. 
2.) the distribution of this information throughout the firm  
3.) the organization’s responsiveness as a whole to this intelligence. 
 
In the first step, it is important to start with identifying the stakeholders that are 
relevant to the firm. These relevant communities are to be analyzed on the basis 
of power each enjoys as well as the ties between them. After this, the firm 
should characterize the concerns about the business’s plan of action that every 
relevant stakeholder group shares. This information can be obtained from 
formal research such as internet searches or press reviews. Another good way 
to gather this type of information is by following employees and managers 
carrying out their daily routines. Finally, the impact on the issues that are 
important to the various stakeholders should be evaluated by the company. The 
second step concerns about the distribution of this gathered information 
throughout the firm. This can be organized formally through activities such as 
newsletters and internal information forums. The third set of activity, 
organization’s responsiveness to the first two steps, consists of the initiatives 
the firm adopts to ensure that it follows or exceeds stakeholders’ expectations 
and has a positive impact on stakeholder issues. These initiatives are likely to be 
specific to a particular stakeholder group, for example family-friendly work 
schedules. Responsiveness processes may also involve the participation of the 
concerned stakeholder groups. (Ferrell et al. 2005: 29-31.) 
 
 
5.3. Social responsibility – Economic issues 
 
From the economical standpoint, companies have an economic responsibility to 
be profitable. This means that companies must provide a return on investment 
to their owners and investors, create jobs for the community and contribute 
goods and services to the community.  
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The economy is affected by the way companies relate to shareholders and other 
investors, employees, customers, competitors, the community and even the 
natural environment. When economic downturns or poor decisions lead 
companies to lay off people, communities often suffer as they attempt to absorb 
the displaced employees. Stock prices often decline when layoffs are 
announced, which affect the value of stockholders’ investment portfolios. 
Product quality, customer service, employee rights and the natural 
environment may be affected by the poor decisions which are made by 
stressed-out employees facing demands to reduce costs. A balance must be 
found between society’s demand for social responsibility and investors’ desire 
for profits. (Ferrell et al. 2005: 50.) 
 
As presented in chapter two, studies have shown that layoff announcements 
have a significant effect on stock prices but there are mixed results of the 
direction of the change. Stock prices often decline, when layoff announcements 
are made public, but in some cases the prices of stocks have also risen because 
of these announcements. Palmon et al. (1997) state that layoff decisions induced 
by unexpected adverse market conditions should be associated with declines in 
profitability measures and firm values, while unexpected layoff decisions 
resulting from improved efficiency should be associated with improved 
profitability measures and higher firm values. This implies that investors 
consider layoffs an effective cost-reduction tool that enhances firm value but 
layoffs induced by worsening market conditions connote negative information. 
Worrell, Davidson III and Sharma (1991) also investigated the strategic 
implications of layoffs. In their study they find that investors reacted negatively 
to announcements attributed to financial reasons. Worrell et al. (1991) also 
noticed that negative preannouncement reactions occurred when negative hints 
about firms preceded announcements. Large and permanent layoff 
announcements elicited stronger negative reactions than other announcements.  
 
The manner in which a firm discloses a layoff announcement may impact the 
share price response. Therefore, the stated purpose for the layoff serves as a 
signal to the marketplace of the future prospects of the firm. However, in some 
cases the stated reason for layoffs may not reflect the true condition of the firm. 
Some firms could say that they are seeking enhanced efficiency by layoffs, but 
in fact they are facing a declining demand for their products. Investors should 
not blindly draw conclusions about the nature of layoff announcements. 
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Announcements should be carefully analyzed to find out the true meaning of 
the signals sent. Filbeck & Webb (2001) think that a control mechanism is 
necessary to control for the market reaction to stated rationales for layoff 
announcements from the market reaction to layoff announcements based on 
differences in informational asymmetries.   
 
The purpose of Zyglidopolous’ (2004) study was to investigate the impact of 
downsizing on a firm’s reputation for corporate social performance (RCSP). 
Understanding the potential impact of downsizing on a firm’s RCSP is 
important in two ways. First, corporate reputation of a firm can be a significant 
source of sustainable competitive advantage, and a better understanding of this 
may help managers to protect the firm’s reputation. Secondly, the 
understanding of the impact of downsizing on a firm’s RCSP can assist 
managers and public administrators to better determine the effectiveness of 
employment reorganization. The main findings of this research imply that 
downsizing has a negative impact on firms RCSP. High financial performance 
prior to the downsizing leads to more negative impact on the firm’s RCSP. 
 
Ferrell et al. (2005: 18) write in their book that adequate financial performance 
in terms of profits must be achieved until a company is able to develop an 
ethical climate. Businesses with greater resources have the ways to practice 
social responsibility while valuing their employees and establishing trust with 
the public. Ferrell et al. (2005) also state that being ethical pays off with better 
performance and such evidence already exists. Companies that are perceived by 
their employees as having a high degree of honesty and integrity had a much 
higher average total return to shareholders, compared to companies perceived 
as having a low degree of such matters.    
 
It takes time for consumers to learn about companies’ social programs and on 
the other hand, it takes time for companies to earn the trust of the community. 
This is one reason why companies with a short-term perspective are less likely 
to make CSR a central strategy. Many financial payoffs from CSR may take time 
to materialize, but companies with longer-term perspectives might be more 
willing to wait for the payoff than other companies with short-term views. 
(Mohr & Webb 2005: 122-123.) 
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5.4. Social responsibility in Finnish society 
 
In Finnish society the forms of social responsibility come true in different ways. 
There are plenty of different types of firms with different possibilities, desires 
and ways to execute social responsibility. The largest companies in Finland are 
globalizing, and these companies following a global strategy usually have their 
own nationality. The national culture of the parent company commonly builds 
the ground for company’s own culture and values. Managers of the large global 
enterprises often make decisions based on expected returns on stocks and 
strong profit maximization in general. This may lead to forgetting the ethical 
side of the decision making. Responsible entrepreneurship aims to fulfill its 
business operational objectives following the universal values of ethics as well 
as the ethics of the area where operating. (Takala 2004: 212.) 
 
During the last few decades, Finnish way of thinking has moved strongly 
towards the Anglo-American way, which is more owner-centered. The latest 
trend in Finland seems to be that owners are starting to be active in the boards 
of directors. In the 1980’s it was the management who controlled the company’s 
operations and the owners were more on the side and just accepted the 
decisions made by management. However, in 2002, large Finnish companies 
made a record paying in dividends. The traditional northern way has so far 
been more stakeholder-oriented, but the concern it that now this owner-
centered thinking is coming to replace it and leaving the ethics with less 
attention. (Takala 2004: 215.) 
 
Panapanaan, Linnanen, Karvonen and Phan (2003) did a study on corporate 
social responsibility in Finland. According to their research, Finnish companies 
are aware that CSR is creating potential implications to their businesses and 
markets. Still, little is known about how Finnish companies are actually dealing 
with and managing social issues relating to their employees and other 
stakeholders. Finnish companies also hardly ever publish any reports on CSR. 
The results of this approach say that employee issues and management are well 
established in most companies, and most policies supporting the welfare of 
employees are in place and available. The most common community 
involvement forms seem to be support for educational activities and research, 
child and youth development and small amounts of grants, donations and 
sponsorship. It was also mentioned that 75 % of the interviewed companies can 
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be considered proactive and opportunity-driven, and therefore seek to enhance 
their policies and strategies towards a good image and better competitiveness.  
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
 
In this chapter, the event study methodology is presented before the brief data 
introduction. Direct measures may require many months or even years of 
observation so this is why event study approach is perhaps the most commonly 
used by researchers.    
 
 
6.1. Event study approach 
 
Measuring the effects of economical events on the value of a firm can be easily 
constructed using an event study. This research methodology measures the 
effect of a specific event on the value of the firm by using data collected from 
financial markets. The usefulness of this method comes from the fact that when 
markets are informationally efficient, the effects of an event will be immediately 
reflected in security prices. The measure of the event’s economic impact can be 
constructed using, for example, stock prices observed over a short period of 
time. In this paper, the event study method quantifies the relationship between 
layoff announcement dates and stock returns. (Bodie et al. 2005: 381; MacKinlay 
1997: 13.) 
 
The general applicability of the event-study approach has led to its wide use. In 
the academic accounting and finance field, event-study methodology has been 
applied to a variety of firm-specific and economy-wide events. Some examples 
include mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements and announcements 
of macroeconomic variables. In most applications, the focus is the effect of an 
event on the price of a particular class of securities of the firm, most often 
common equity. (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 1997: 149.)   
 
Bowman (1983) introduces the simplest form of event study model. This type of 
information and market efficiency test is also used in this paper, and it includes 
five steps: 
 
1. Identify the event of interest. Many studies are investigations of a type of 
event, which occurs for different companied at a different calendar times. 
To make these events comparable, the calendar date or the event 
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becomes time zero in event time. After this, all time periods are 
described in event time relative to the zero time when the event 
occurred.  
2. Model the security price reaction. This is the part where the hypotheses are 
to be made. In the simplest cases the estimation of security price reaction 
to an event is not a problem. But sometimes, for example, a model is 
developed to separate the firms into groups of expected positive and 
expected negative security price reactions.  
3. Estimate the excess returns. In this step a method of estimating the excess 
returns for the firms under study is to be chosen. After this the residuals 
are calculated from the chosen model. 
4. Organize and group the excess returns. After the excess returns have been 
calculated, they must be organized and grouped before the final analysis. 
Similar to step two, firms may be put into groups according to the 
expected security price reaction.  
5. Analyze the results. Now the results are analyzed and interpreted. The 
data are presented in graphics and tables given an interpretation of the 
hypotheses.    
 
 
6.2. Calculating cumulative abnormal returns 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated for three alternative 
announcement periods around the publication date of each announcement 
(which is denoted as day 0). The alternative announcement periods are a two-
day period that includes days -1 and 0, a three-day period from day -1 through 
day 1 and a twelve-day period from day -1 through day 10. The 12-day CARs 
are computed to check the persistence of the abnormal returns. CARs are 
calculated by finding out the difference between the actual stock returns and 
the market returns. The OMX Helsinki index serves as a market return. Average 
cumulative abnormal returns (ACARs) are used in statistical tests, and the t-
statistic determines the statistical significance of the ACARs.  
 
Some nonparametric tests are used to assess whether any of the results are 
induced by a skewed distribution of returns. For example the kurtosis and 
skewness are reported for each alternative announcement periods. One highly 
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negative abnormal return may affect the results of these tests in the declining-
demand subsample. However, this exceptionally negative CAR is left out from 
the OLS estimation to check whether it has any further effect. 
 
6.3. Data of the study 
 
The final sample includes 28 announcements of cooperation negotiations. OMX 
Helsinki, company disclosures and Reuters’ database are used to collect all 
required data and other information about the companies. During the 2003 to 
the spring of 2006 sample period, only the latest announcements of each firm 
are used. Also, no other contaminating events such as stock repurchases or 
annual reports should not have been reported publicly during the 12-day 
period beginning at day t = -1 and ending on day t = +10. Day t = 0 is the 
announcement day.  
 
Using the reason for the possible layoff decision, announcements are classified 
into two subsamples. Announcements of cooperation negotiations that state 
declining sales or low product prices as a reason for the possible layoff are 
included in the declining-demand subsample. Announcements indicating an 
intention to improve profitability or efficiency are assigned to the efficiency-
enhancing subsample. Examples of quoted reasons for layoff decisions are 
presented in the Appendix. 
 
Table 1 shows all 28 companies divided into two subsamples. Both subsamples 
consist of a total of 14 firms. Table 1 also shows the average number of 
employees per firm and the average fraction of employees who were under 
cooperation negotiations.  
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the firms in the two subsamples. The 
total number of employees of each firm is taken from the companies’ annual 
reports. Possible layoff ratio is the fraction of employees under cooperation 
negotiations. The average number of employees for the declining-demand 
subsample was 6.643 and for the efficiency-enhancing subsample 6.655. 
Therefore, the difference in the average firm size between the two subsamples is 
not significant even at the 0,10 level (the t-statistic equals -0,003). The possible 
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layoff ratios for the subsamples were 16,14 % and 12,11 %. This difference is not 
significant either (the t-statistic is 0,615).  
 
 
Table 1. Sample firms divided into two subsamples. 
  Declining-Demand Subsample  
        Possible    
    Number of   layoff   
Firm   employees ln (empl) ratio CAR -1,0 
Beltton-Group Plc   485 6.1841 21.44% 0.4835% 
Comptel Plc   576 6.3561 1.74% 2.7300% 
Efore Plc   512 6.2383 61.72% -0.9322% 
Finnair Plc   9,447 9.1535 7.09% -6.8642% 
Fiskars Corporation   3,448 8.1455 2.76% -6.8252% 
Orion Plc   4,534 8.4194 1.99% 0.0394% 
Perlos Plc   7,679 8.9462 7.81% -26.7567% 
PKC Group Plc   2,742 7.9164 31.51% 0.3756% 
Ramirent Plc   2,317 7.7480 25.90% 0.8926% 
Raute Plc   539 6.2897 18.55% -2.9260% 
Scanfil Plc   2,354 7.7639 5.10% -8.6327% 
Stora Enso Plc   45,307 10.7212 4.41% -1.0649% 
Sysopen Digia Plc   288 5.6630 34.72% 2.2428% 
Tietoenator Plc   12,773 9.4551 1.25% 0.1960% 
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    Efficiency-Enhancing Subsample   
        Possible    
    Number of   layoff    
Firm   employees ln (empl) ratio CAR -1,0 
Aspocomp Group Plc   3,377 8.1247 15.99% 2.0454% 
Elcoteq SE Plc A   20,000 9.9035 4.35% -0.4661% 
eQ Plc   134 4.8978 6.72% -1.3077% 
Exel Plc   466 6.1442 36.48% -6.4793% 
HK Ruokatalo Group Plc   4,541 8.4209 7.05% 1.6621% 
KCI Konecranes Plc   4,350 8.3779 1.95% 1.5496% 
Kesko Corp.   17,528 9.7716 0.91% -0.8801% 
Kyrö Corporation   1,222 7.1082 2.70% 1.0246% 
Lännen tehtaat Plc   1,033 6.9402 5.32% -1.0682% 
Nordic Aluminium Plc   314 5.7494 63.69% 5.1987% 
OMX AB   1,355 7.2116 3.17% -1.4537% 
Salcomp Plc   6,305 8.7491 0.32% 4.4123% 
UPM-Kymmene Plc   31,500 10.3577 9.37% 5.3537% 
Vaisala Plc   1,042 6.9489 11.52% 0.0107% 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for firms that announce to start cooperation negotiations. 
Descriptive Measure   Mean   Median   Std Deviation 
    Panel A. Declining-Demand Subsample     
        
Total Employees Per 
Firm  6 643  2 548  11761,62
(In Thousands) (t Stat -0,003)     
        
Possible Layoff Ratio  16,14 %  7,45 %  0,176
  (t Stat 0,615)     
                
 
 
 
Descriptive Measure   Mean   Median   Std Deviation 
    Panel B. Efficiency-Enhancing Subsample     
        
Total Employees Per 
Firm  6 655  2 366  9511,90
(In Thousands)       
        
Possible Layoff Ratio  12,11 %  6,02 %  0,175
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, the results of the tests of the two hypotheses are reported. It is 
being examined, whether the reasons cited in announcements of cooperation 
negotiations help investors to analyze the implications of possible layoff 
announcements as they affect the values of the announcing firms.  
 
 
7.1. Cumulative abnormal returns 
  
Next, the two-day, three-day and twelve-day abnormal returns for 14 firms 
citing declining demand and 14 firms citing efficiency enhancement as reason 
for cooperation negotiations are presented. In Tables three, four and five are the 
statistics on the CARs for the alternative announcement periods for each of the 
two subsamples. The two- and three-day CARs that are computed for the 
declining-demand subsample are negative and significantly different from zero 
at the 0,10 level, but not at the 0,05 level. ACAR-1,0  and ACAR-1,1 are -1,68 % (the 
t-statistic is -1,65) and -1,16 % (the t-statistic is -1,49). In contrast, the 
corresponding CARs for the firms in the efficiency-enhancing subsample are 
positive but not significantly different from zero. ACAR-1,0  and ACAR-1,1 are 
now 0,34 % (t-statistic = 0,82) and 0,02 % (t-statistic equals 0,05).  
 
The persistence of the abnormal returns is checked by calculating the twelve-
day CARs. As shown in Table 5, the 12-day average CAR for the firms in the 
declining-demand subsample is -0,33 % (the t-statistic is -1,34, which is not 
significantly different from zero at the 0,05 or even at the 0,10 level). The 
corresponding average cumulative abnormal return for the firms in the 
efficiency-enhancing subsample is -0,10 % (the t-statistic is -0,69, and therefore 
is not significantly different from zero). The results reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5 
indicate that the returns on equity of firms that cite an adverse market condition 
(improving efficiency) as a reason for starting cooperation negotiations are not 
abnormally negative (positive). Thus, the first hypothesis is not supported by 
the results, except for the fact that the two- and three-day CARs of the 
declining-demand subsample are negative and significantly different from zero 
at the 0,10 level. 
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7.2. Ordinary least squares procedure 
 
The impact of announcing cooperation negotiations on stock returns is further 
demonstrated by investigating the relation between the possible layoff ratio 
(denoted as LATER, Layoff-to-Employee Ratio) and the CARs. The LATER is 
calculated dividing the amount of employees under the cooperation 
negotiations by the total amount of employees in a firm. A negative impact of 
the possible layoff ratio on the CARs for the declining-demand subsample and 
a corresponding positive impact for the efficiency-enhancing subsample firms 
should support the second hypothesis. The logarithm of the number of 
employees is added as an explanatory variable (denoted as FSIZE, Firm Size), 
because firm size can affect abnormal returns.  
 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedure is used to test the 
relation between two-day cumulative abnormal return, possible layoff size and 
firm size in each subsample. The regression model is specified as follows: 
 
 
(9)    CAR(-1,0)i  = α + β1LATERi  + β2FSIZEi  + ui   
 
 
The estimates of the regressions appear in Table 6. The estimated β1 coefficient 
for the declining-demand subsample is -0,014 but it is not different from zero 
(the t-statistic is 0,298). In contrast, the estimated β1 coefficient for the efficiency-
enhancing subsample is 0,010, and this is not different from zero either with the 
t-statistic of 1,057. The estimated β2 coefficient for the declining-demand 
subsample is 0,045 (the t-statistic is -0,795, which means that it is not different 
from zero significantly). Its counterpart in the efficiency-enhancing subsample 
is 0,058 and this is different from zero at the 0,10 significance level (the t-statistic 
= 1,645). The F-statistic and p-value are 0,737 and 50,1 % for the declining-
demand subsample, and 1,400 and 28,7 % for the efficiency-enhancing 
subsample.  
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Table 3. Two-day average cumulative abnormal return. 
      
  
Declining-Demand 
Subsample 
Efficiency-Enhancing 
Subsample 
            
      
ACAR -1,0       
Mean  -1.68%  0.34%  
Median  -0.22%  0.26%  
Percent Negative  50.00%  42.86%  
Min  -13.38%  -3.24%  
Max  1.37%  2.68%  
Skewness  -2.53  -0.43  
Std deviation  0.04  0.02  
Kurtosis  7.33  1.01  
t-Statistics  -1.65  0.82  
    
 
 
Table 4. Three-day average cumulative abnormal return. 
      
  
Declining-Demand 
Subsample 
Efficiency-Enhancing 
Subsample 
            
      
ACAR -1,1       
Mean  -1.16%  0.02%  
Median  -0.21%  -0.13%  
Percent Negative  57.14%  57.14%  
Min  -9.85%  -2.24%  
Max  1.24%  2.25%  
Skewness  -2.37  0.08  
Std deviation  0.03  0.01  
Kurtosis  6.11  0.40  
t-Statistics  -1.49  0.05  
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Table 5. Twelve-day average cumulative abnormal return.  
      
  
Declining-Demand 
Subsample 
Efficiency-Enhancing 
Subsample 
            
      
ACAR -1,10       
Mean  -0.33%  -0.10%  
Median  -0.10%  -0.08%  
Percent Negative  50.00%  50.00%  
Min  -3.04%  -1.15%  
Max  0.95%  0.86%  
Skewness  -2.10  -0.43  
Std deviation  0.01  0.01  
Kurtosis  6.34  0.29  
t-Statistics  -1.34  -0.69  
            
 
 
Table 6. Ordinary-Least-Squares Regression. 
       
  Independent Variables    
          
Declining-Demand Subsample     
       
Constant  LATER FSIZE R Square F-Statistics p-Value
       
0.068  -0.014 0.045 0.118 0.737 0.501 
 (t-stat 0.443) (0.298) (-0.795)    
       
Efficiency-Enhancing Subsample     
       
Constant  LATER FSIZE R Square F-Statistics p-Value
       
-0.076  0.010 0.058 0.203 1.400 0.287 
(t-stat -1.511) * (1.057) (1.645) *    
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Table 7. Ordinary-Least-Squares Regression (outliers excluded). 
       
  Independent Variables    
           
Declining-Demand Subsample     
       
Constant  LATER FSIZE R Square F-Statistics p-Value
       
0.013  0.040 -0.005 0.116 0.655 0.540 
(t-stat 0.169)  (0.549) (-0.523)    
       
Efficiency-Enhancing Subsample     
       
Constant  LATER FSIZE R Square F-Statistics p-Value
       
-0.076  0.010 0.058 0.203 1.400 0.287 
(t-stat -1.511) * (1.057) (1.645) *    
               
 
 
In Table 7, one firm is left out from the declining-demand subsample because of 
its exceptionally negative two-day cumulative abnormal return. Therefore, the 
same coefficients β1 and β2 are now 0,040 and -0,005. No difference with the 
significances of these coefficients is notable.  
 
Thus, the results presented in Tables six and seven indicate that the magnitude 
of the abnormal negative returns on equity is not directly related to the 
magnitude of the possible layoffs for those firms that cite an adverse market 
condition as the reason for starting cooperation negotiations. However, the 
results claim that the size of the firms in the efficiency-enhancing subsample 
may help investors to infer changes in firm values when they are announcing 
about cooperation negotiations.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
When a company announces to start cooperation negotiations it often means 
that a layoff decision will follow. These layoff decisions can be associated with 
either an increase or a decrease in firm value. In most cases, investors among 
others may assume that layoff decisions induced by adverse market conditions 
such as demand declines or input price increases, should be associated with 
declines in sales and profitability measures and furthermore in firm values. On 
the other hand, layoff decisions resulting from unexpected efficiency gains or 
plans for efficiency improvements are assumed to be associated with increasing 
sales and firm values.   
 
In this these examinations, negative abnormal returns are found for firms that 
belong to the declining-demand subsample, and this supports the first 
hypothesis. In this subsample it is typical that the announcement takes place 
due to declining sales or low product price. The persistence of the negative 
abnormal returns is tested by calculating the twelve-day cumulative abnormal 
returns. However, it can be inferred from the results that the twelve-day CARs 
are not significantly negative anymore.   
 
The first hypothesis of this thesis continues that firms belonging to the 
efficiency-enhancing subsample should have positive abnormal returns. These 
companies usually announce about possibly upcoming layoffs because they 
need to improve efficiency or reduce costs. However, for the firms that cite an 
efficiency enhancement as a reason for starting cooperation negotiations, 
significantly positive abnormal returns are not found.  
 
It is also examined, whether the magnitude of the abnormal negative or positive 
returns is directly related to the magnitude of the possible layoffs. The sample 
size is relatively small for this type of study in the first place, so this may be one 
reason why the results do not match the hypotheses as thought. It can still be 
concluded that in case of the efficiency-enhancing subsample, knowing the size 
of the firms may help investors to predict changes in firm values when the 
companies are announcing about cooperation negotiations. This type of relation 
cannot be seen within the declining-demand subsample. 
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Like it was already mentioned in chapter five that firms have an economic 
responsibility to be profitable. However, companies must remember that when 
announcing about upcoming layoffs, the manner in which a firm discloses the 
announcement may impact the share price. Of course every case is different and 
sometimes the cited reason or the manner of announcing may reflect the true 
condition of the firm but sometimes not. This is why investors should not 
blindly stare at only these aspects when drawing conclusions about the general 
state of a company.   
 
Future research on layoff announcements especially in Finland could take into 
consideration firms’ future profitability measures. If there occurs an association 
between the cited reasons for layoffs and companies’ profitability measures, it 
might indicate that the cited reasons could actually reflect the true motivation 
for the layoffs. Palmon et al. (1997) wonder why firms announce a declining 
market condition as a reason for a layoff in the first place, because investors 
perceive such an announcement as a negative signal.  
 
When a company starts cooperation negotiations, they usually announce the 
amount of employees who are under the risk of losing jobs. After the 
negotiations have been completed, the company discloses another 
announcement of the final outcome. In most cases the firms are able to reduce 
costs by laying off less people than they initially intended. It would be nice to 
know what is the impact of the actual layoff ratio on stock returns and perhaps 
compare these announcements’ effect on firm value.  
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Appendix 1. Examples of cooperation negotiation announcements by reasons.  
 
1) Declining sales or low product price: This category generally includes 
announcements in which firms cite worsening market conditions, excess 
production capacity and lower product prices among the reasons for the 
possible layoff. 
 
 Example: Perlos Plc. announces to start cooperation negotiations 
concerning approximately 7 700 employees due to lower demand. 
 
2) Improving efficiency or reducing costs:  This category generally includes 
layoffs that are announced as firms purposely attempt to reduce costs or 
improve efficiency.  
 
 Example: Kesko Corp. discloses reorganization plans aimed at making 
business more efficient. These plans concern more than 17 000 
employees. 
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Appendix 2. OLS-estimation, summary outputs 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT declining-demand subsample     
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.3437      
R Square 0.1182      
Adjusted R Square -0.0422      
Standard Error 0.0776      
Observations 14      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F Significance F  
Regression 2 0.0089 0.0044 0.7369 0.5008  
Residual 11 0.0662 0.0060    
Total 13 0.0750        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
CAR 0.0680 0.1534 0.4434 0.6660 -0.2696 0.4056
FSIZE -0.0140 0.0176 -0.7948 0.4435 -0.0527 0.0247
LATER 0.0445 0.1494 0.2982 0.7711 -0.2842 0.3733
       
SUMMARY OUTPUT efficiency-enhancing subsample    
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.4504      
R Square 0.2029      
Adjusted R Square 0.0579      
Standard Error 0.0303      
Observations 14      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F Significance F  
Regression 2 0.0026 0.0013 1.3998 0.2873  
Residual 11 0.0101 0.0009    
Total 13 0.0127        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
CAR -0.0756 0.0500 -1.5106 0.1591 -0.1858 0.0346
FSIZE 0.0097 0.0059 1.6451 0.1282 -0.0033 0.0227
LATER 0.0579 0.0548 1.0566 0.3133 -0.0627 0.1785
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SUMMARY OUTPUT declining-demand subsample (outliers 
excluded)   
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 0.3403      
R Square 0.1158      
Adjusted R Square -0.0610      
Standard Error 0.0377      
Observations 13      
       
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F Significance F  
Regression 2 0.0019 0.0009 0.6548 0.5404  
Residual 10 0.0142 0.0014    
Total 12 0.0161        
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
CAR 0.0127 0.0751 0.1690 0.8691 -0.1547 0.1801
FSIZE -0.0045 0.0087 -0.5233 0.6122 -0.0239 0.0148
LATER 0.0399 0.0726 0.5493 0.5949 -0.1219 0.2017
 
 
 
